



  Page 1 
Good to Share? The Pecuniary Implications of Moving to Shared Service Production 




Shared services are often lauded as an efficacious means of reducing municipal expenditure 
and thereby improving waning financial sustainability. However, most of the extant 
theoretical and empirical work only considers costs and benefits at the level of the specific 
service in question and hence fails to capture many of the wider benefits and costs that might 
accrue to local governments. In this paper we first build a schematic structure to illustrate 
the benefits and costs of moving from separate to collaborative production at the level of 
individual local authorities. We then test two hypotheses drawn from the schematic against a 
five-year panel of expenditure data. We find evidence of increased expenditure in the order of 
eight per cent that prima facie runs counter to the objectives of many municipal managers 
engaged with shared services. We conclude by considering the implications of our findings 
for cooperative ventures between local authorities. 
Shared services are often lauded as an efficacious means of reducing municipal expenditure 
and thereby improving waning financial sustainability. However, there is a dearth of 
empirical evidence amost of the extant empirical work only considers costs and benefits at 
the level of the specific service in question and hence fails to capture many of the wider 
benefits and costs that might accrue to local governmentst the whole-of-local-government 
level to validate the claims made by advocates of shared services. Moreover, theorising at the 
whole-of -local-government levellevel of the local government unit is incomplete and neglects 
significant costs arising indirectly from cooperative ventures and thus neglects costs that are 
exogenous to the particular service being shared. In this paper we first build a 
comprehensive modelschematic structure to illustrate the benefits and costs of moving from 
separate to collaborative production at the level of individual local authoritiesgovernments 
of the whole-of-local-government implications arising from adoption of shared services, 
which is applicable to all local government systemsjurisdictions. We then test our model 
against a five-year panel of expenditure datatwo hypotheses drawn from the schematic 
structure against a five yearfive-year panel of expenditure data. We find evidence of 
increased expenditure in the order of eight per cent whichcent that prima facie runs counter 
to the objectives and narratives of many municipallocal government managersexecutives 
engaged with shared services. We conclude by considering the implications of our findings 
for cooperative ventures between local authorities. 
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Introduction 
Numerous reasons have been tendered for why shared provision of local government goods 
and services might be preferred over other production arrangements (Chen and Thurmaier 
2009; Tomkinson 2007). For instance, it has been argued that shared services may facilitate 
more coherent regional planning (Kim and Warner 20172016), deliver improvements to 
service quality (Aldag and Warner 2017), promote innovation (Carr and Hawkins 2013), 
reduce professional isolation and address recruiting difficulties relating to managerial and 
technical expertise, especially in rural areas (Dollery et al 2016Conway et al. 2011; Bel and 
Warner 2015). In addition, shared services have also been cited as a mechanism for 
internalising externalities (whereby provision of a service in one local government area might 
otherwise result in positive or negative side-effects in neighbouring municipalities) (Kwon 
and Feiock 2010).  
However, the most common rationalisation for shared service arrangements rests on the 
assertion that co-operative collaborative ventures will result in reduced expenditure (Dollery 
et al. 2016; Noda 2017). This motivation has become particularly important given the 
austerity measures imposed by many national governments in the wake of the Global 
Financial Crisis (Aldag and Warner 2017). Furthermore, a belated realisation that municipal 
mergers have proved largely unsuccessful in improving local government financial 
sustainability has also encouraged policy makers and local authorities alike to consider the 
use of shared service production (Grant and Drew 2017). Indeed, ‘often consolidation and 
cooperation are seen as alternative tools for confronting similar problems’, with opponents of 
amalgamation stressing that shared services can be an efficacious means of capturing the 
benefits of scale without the expense and disruption that necessarily accompanies 
councilmunicipality consolidation (Bel and Warner 2015, p. 64). 
A substantial empirical literature exists on the impact of municipal mergers on council 
performance, including operating costs (Allers and Geertsema 2016). Furthermore, recent 
work has examined the system-wide effects of municipal mergers on costs (Grant and Drew 
2017Drew et al. 2016). In addition, a significant body of empirical work has considered the 
effects of privatisation in local government (Bel et al., Fageda and Warner 2010). However, 
much less effort has been directed at investigating the impact of shared services on the costs 
of service provision (Bel and Warner 2015; Bel and Gradus 2018; Blaeschkea and Haugb 
2018). As Bel and Warner (2015, p.53) have observed ‘cooperation has received far less 
attention than privatization, and the literature is still scarce with respect to cost evaluation’.  
Indeed, the evidential basis for claims of costs-savings from shared services is both scant and 
inconclusive (Aldag and Warner 2017; Dollery et al. 2016). Most of the evidence in both the 
scholarly and grey literatures is survey-based and frequently lacking in rigour (Bel and 
Warner 2015; Carr and Hawkins 2013). In addition, much of the ‘grey literature’ is clouded 
by moral hazard (see, for example, KPMG 2015). Moreover, the bulk of empirical evidence 
relates to a single class of shared services (waste collection and processing)is restricted to 
only considering the pecuniary effects at the level of the particular service in question – - 
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neglect important benefits and costs that only occur at the wider level of individual local 
councilsgovernments. An unfortunate consequence of these various gaps and deficiencies in 
the empirical literature is that local government policy makers and municipalitie councils 
alike make important decisions, often involving high up-front costs, in the absence of 
soundupportive empirical evidence.  
There are a number of reasons for believing that shared services – far from enhancing 
municipal efficiency – may generate higher unit costs, particularly at the whole-of-local-
government level. Some of these factors have been considered in the shared service literature 
and include inter alia the nett effect of agency costs, information costs, division costs, co-
ordination costs and defection costs (see, for example, Klok et al. 2018; Kwon and Feiock 
2010; Carr and Hawkins 2013). However, the literature has hitherto ignored other important 
reasons for why shared services may exacerbate local government financial sustainability 
problems. These reasons include the negation of factors which would otherwise underpin 
economically efficient decentralised government, as well as exogenous costs arising 
indirectly from the shared service enterprise. In general, these causes of reduced efficiency 
flowing from shared service adoption have been overlooked due to the focus in the literature 
on analysing single classes of local functions and local services rather than whole-of-local-
government outcomes. The extant literature has made note of a number of reasons for why a 
move from separate to shared service provision may not generate expected pecuniary savings 
when considered at the level of the specific service collaboratively produced. In particular, 
co-ordination, division and defection costs have been identified as having the potential to 
‘completely offset any production cost savings gained through intergovernmental 
cooperation’ (Carr and Hawkins, 2013, p. 229). However, when one moves beyond the level 
of the service in question to also consider costs that might only be evident at the level of 
individual local authoritiesgovernments, the potential for shared services to result in nettt 
pecuniary savings seems even more unlikely. We refer to these costs as ‘exogenous costs’ 
because they do not relate directly to the specific service produced collaboratively and would 
normally lie outside of nettt benefit calculations at the service level, such as the (examples 
include erosion of economies of scope, failure to meaningfully redeploy assets and staff, and 
residual functions retained by the local government). By broadening the unit of theoretical 
and empirical analysis to consider individual local governments (rather than just individual 
services), we can better account for these exogenous costs and thusIn this paper we address 
anthis important gap in the literature by considering the effects of shared services on the 
expenditure at the whole-of-local-government level. 
The paper is divided into four main partsis divided into four main parts. In the next section, 
we draw attention to the benefit and cost calculus which emerges when we broaden our 
perspective from the level of specific services to the level of the local government unit. In 
particular, we note the salience of exogenous costs to a local government level evaluation of 
the nett pecuniary outcomes arising from the shift to shared production. WFollowing this we 
then outline an empirical strategy to investigate the differing nettt pecuniary outcomes 
associated with shared services by geographically adjacent municipalities under the 









  Page 5 
develop a comprehensive framework for analysing the whole-of-local-government 
expenditure effects arising from participation in shared service arrangements. In particular we 
draw attention to the salience of heterogeneity and number of partner municipalities, 
transaction costs, and costs exogenous to the co-operative venture. This leads us to develop 
two hypotheses which we subsequently test through employing a five year panel of empirical 
data. Following this extension to the extant theory, we outline our empirical strategy and the 
sources of the data that we use. Thereafter, we consider the results obtained from testing our 
hypotheses against panel data where we find statistically significant evidence that supports 
our theoretical insights regarding the high likelihood that shared service arrangements may 
result in increased local government expenditurediscuss the statistical associations arising 
from our econometric analyses on a five- year panel of South Australian (SA) data. We 
conclude our paper with a consideration of the implications arising from our 
findings.discussion of the implications of our work for practitioners and scholars alike, along 
with a suggestions for future brief outline of the work whichwork that might follow from a 
new research agenda recalibrated at the level of individual local governments.  
 
Conceptual Framework for Understanding the CostUnderstanding the Nettt Pecuniary Outcomes of Moving to Colaborative ProvisionductionShared Services  
Before moving on to consider specific pecuniary benefits and costs arising from moving 
service production to a collaborative arrangement it is important to briefly consider the 
economic rationale for decentralised government. The decentralisation theorem ‘establishes, 
on grounds of economic efficiency, a presumption in favour of decentralised provision of 
public goods with localised effects’, which occurs principally as a result of the capacity to 
cater to the different preferences and production costs which is unlikely to occur in (more 
uniform) centralised public service provision (Oates 1999, p. 122). The idea here is that for 
some public goods residents and business have particular tastes and that by matching the 
public good offerings to the tastes of the resident consumer we are able to maximise 
efficiency in a way that might not be possible in more centralised production. For instance, 
residents in some suburban areas may have a preference for additional green waste 
collections, but residents in other areas may be content with simplyjust a general waste 
collection (such asfor example residents living in high densityhigh-density areas dominated 
by apartments). Moreover, the costs of providing services will vary by location.  T– thus, 
even if tastes were similar, the differing costs would likely result in entirely different benefit-
cost evaluations and hence choices by citizens and the local authoritiesgovernments that 
represent them (Dollery et al., 2006). When combined with a Tieboutian (1956) 
conceptiontian ideas that citizens sort themselves into more or less homogenous groups 
(homogeneity (in terms of tastes for public goods), then the ability to tailor service provision 
through decentralised government promises optimal efficiency (Grant and Drew 2017). 
When local governments combine to produce services collaboratively there is the potential 
that efficiency might be reduced if the service in question is one that was previously 
produced to reflect varying tastes of residents and if the service produced collaboratively is 
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tastes of residents since (sometimes standards are regulated by higher tiers of government). 
Moreover, shared services need not be produced to a uniform standard (although it would 
often invoke additional costsseem difficult to manage a collaborative enterprise where there 
were various standards of services in place depending on the location of the resident). 
However, in the cases where services previously tailored to the taste of local government 
residents are shifted to a uniform standard produced by a collaborative venture of two or 
more local governments, then it will be the case that the arrangement will weakenundermine 
the foundations behind the economic rationalepreference for decentralised government. This 
suggests that the more heterogeneous (in terms of resident tastes for public goods) the 
populations comprising theare of local government areass entering into collaborative 
arrangements, then the greater the potential for changes in economic welfare arising from 
provision of shared services at a uniform standard. I (it also follows that loss will be 
proportional to the number of heterogeneous partners involved (; Carr and Hawkins, 2013).  
It is important to stress thatNotably heterogeneity in local government servicesgoods is not 
restricted to demand-side forces.  –I it is also possible that different local governments will 
exhibit heterogeneity on the supply side. The clearest case of supply-side heterogeneity is in 
the area of production processes where local governments may choose varying combinationslevels 
of input factors (labour and capital/labour ratios). Under these circumstances, mMoving to shared services 
when constituent local governments previously exhibited supply-side heterogeneity will 
result in some change in production process for at least one local government, with likely 
consequences for unit cost. This is a benefit or cost directly contingent uponfollowing on from the decision to 
produce services collaboratively. It is thus and is therefore best consideredthought of as an element of the nettt pecuniary 
outcome arising from a shift to collaborative production. 
Our purpose in this papere work that follows is to make clear how the specific benefits and 
costs dealt with in the literature devolveresolve into pecuniary outcomes arising from the 
decision to move from separate production to a collaborative arrangement. It is entirely 
possible that other benefits might arise from the move to shared services: (for instance, the 
quality of services might improve thus predicatingsuggesting better value for residents.), 
However, but here we are only concerned only with questions relating to the expenditure 
implications for local governments. To achieve this objective we first examine pecuniary 
benefits associated with moving to shared service production. This is followed by a brief 
discussion of pecuniary costs. Following this we present a schematic structure that 
summarises our arguments and can be used as a helpful tool for decision making by 
practitioners. We then derive two hypotheses (from a number of questions that might be 
asked in relation to the schematic structure), before proceeding to the sequent section on our 
empirical design and context for the study. 
Pecuniary Benefits of Moving to Shared Services 
A major caveat to the decentralisation theorem, which we noted earlierreviewed above, 
resides in its presumption  that efficiency outcomes might be improved through the capture 
ofby economies of scale able to be captured by less decentralised (and hence larger) 
government units. Economies of scale refer to the proposition that – under certain conditions 
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-economic concept whereby average total costs mayare expected to initialy decrease for some production processes, as output increases, .Scale economies representand are the main 
source of pecuniary benefits citednoted in the literature (see, for example, Feiock 2007). 
Scale eEconomies generally derive from greater specialisation associated withpossible at 
higher output, use of excess capacity for capital intensivecapital-intensive plant, and 
enhanced purchasing power. However, it is important to note that not all local government 
production functions exhibit economies of scale. Indeed, the empirical evidence for 
economies of scale to date has been rather mixed. Moreover, and where evidence of 
economies has been uncovered it has tended to occur at relatively low levels of output (Fahey 
et al., 2016). It is also important to understand that once output has been increased to a level 
that fully exhausts economies of scale, then this is typically followed by a relatively longarge 
domain of constant returns to scale (where costs do not change as output increases). If output 
is expandsed even further, then diseconomies of scale may emerge (and hence increase 
average total cost accompanying greater output) as a result of problems inter alia co-
ordinating large numbers of staff and a reduction in the transparency of the organisation. 
Figure 1 depicts potential economies related to scale that may emerge for some local 
government functions. For these types of functions moving to a shared service arrangement 
may substantially reduce unit cost if output by separate production had not fully exhausted 
economies of scale and, if the combined output of the collaborative arrangement is such that 
it does notn’t incur significant diseconomies of scale.  
[PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
Figure 1: Average Total Costs for Production Functions Exhibiting Economies of Scale 
A second source of potential pecuniary benefits arising from a move to shared services occurs 
when the arrangement results in externalities being internalised (LeRoux et al. 2010). 
Externalities occur when the conduct of one party has positive or negative effects on another 
party. For example, flood mitigation works by a local government may have significant 
implications for adjoining municipalities. By entering into shared service arrangements with 
geographically adjoining local councilsgovernments it may be possible to more effectively 
share the costs or benefits of negative or positive externalities. For instance, if flood 
mitigation work at a given municipality has reduced the likelihood of flooding for 
neighbouring municipalities upstream, then it might be possible to have these neighbours 
internalise some of the costs for the benefits that they have received through entering into 
collaborative arrangements (and co-ordinated efforts might also improve non-pecuniary 
outcomes). Having neighbours internalise benefits or costs as a result of collaboration not 
only provides a pecuniary advantage to the municipality which previously bore the entire 
cost, but may also may lead to more effective and economically efficient collaborative 
solutions. F (for example, it might be cheaper in the long run for the upstream municipality to 
also do some work to avoid the build-up of debris and invasive weeds that would otherwise 
continue to inflict costs oncause work for the downstream local authoritygovernment). 
The third source of potential pecuniary benefitsoutcomes arise from medium-run dynamic 
improvements as a resultattendant on of collaboration. For instance,Conceivably the act of 
collaboration may result in municipallocal government staff learning new skills and better 
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ways of producing services (Brown and Potoski, 2005). It may also be the case that larger 
collaborative ventures serve tocan attract more skilled staffstaff who are more skilled. In 
addition, , these ventures mayand provide greater opportunities for professional staff to 
betterpeer review and otherwise share professional knowledge. This area has largely escaped 
attention in the shared services literature. MoreoverHowever, it and would be difficult to 
measure and test empirically, largely because  (because cost reductions attendant on learning 
typicallywould emerge over the medium term and occur unevenly).  
It should be stressed thatNotably all of these benefits from collaborative production could be 
gained through other meansmechanisms. For instance, scale can be increase through 
boundary change and consolidation,  – although changes of this type necessarily result in all 
functions being increased to the same scale, which can be problematic given empirical the 
evidence onf functionally specific optimal scale. In similar vein, externalities can be 
addressed through transfer payments and learning through staff exchange or professional 
networks. However, it is certainly the case that shared services offers more flexibility than its 
alternatives: – in principle, local councilsgovernments could mix and match partners for 
different functions in order to optimise scale and source complementary skills or plant. 
Flexibility is thuserefore an important attribute of the shared service model that may give rise 
to greater pecuniary benefits than might be achieved through other avenues.  
Pecuniary Costs of Moving to Shared Services 
Entering into a shared service arrangement necessarily involves new upfront costs. U (upfront 
costs also occur for separate service production also and may even be lower in this latter 
case., However,but in this paper we look at shared services from established functions and 
thus are only concerned with the decision to move from separate to shared 
productionduction). In an economic sensesense, all upfront costs are considered to be fixed 
costs sincebecause they arise prior to before any service productionn occurs (and would exist 
even if there were nonil production; ) (Brown and Potoski 2005). However, it is certainly the 
case that upfront costs will vary inter alia according inter alia to the number of partner 
municipalities, supply-side heterogeneity of partner municipalitieslocal governments, and the 
type of sharedthe service to be shared. The literature includes the costs of finding partner 
municipalities, holding negotiations, establishing or renegotiating contracts with suppliers, 
and consulting with affected staff and local residents (see, for instance, Carr and Hawkins 
2013).  
However, tThere are also a number of significantizeable and unanticipated costs that seem to 
have largely escaped notice in the literature. For instance, contributions of assets may involve 
recognition of losses on disposal where the book value differs from the fair value of the asset 
contributed. Most of these costs will be recognised in accounting statements produced at the 
end of the financial year in which the shared service arrangement is established. However, 
from an economic perspective it is probably more appropriate to think of these costs as being 
apportioned over the life of the collaborative venture,  (although we recognise that this will 
often be difficult to factor into the decision- making process where the life of the arrangement 
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is not known a priori). Thus, under this conception, the value derived from the upfront costs 
is proportional to the duration of the life of the shared service arrangement. 
Transaction costs arise due to uncertainty, information asymmetries and the potential for 
partners to behave in an opportunistic manner (Brown and Potoski, 2005). They and include 
inter alia division, information, co-ordination, free-rider and defection costs. Division costs 
refer to how the gross transaction surplus is distributed between participatingconstituent local 
authoritiesgovernments. There is good reason to believe that larger local authorities or 
municipalitiesies contributing greater expertise may use their relative power and knowledge 
to obtain a larger slice of the gross transaction surplus than might otherwise be warranted 
(Carr and Hawkins 2013). In addition, the cost structure for each constituent municipality 
may well be dissimilar as a result of both supply-side and demand -side heterogeneity. This 
implies that even if the gross accounting surplus was distributed in proportion to the number 
of units previously produced, the resultant bargaining surplus might be asymmetrically 
apportioneddistributed between participating municipalities. In contrast, information costs, on 
the other hand, apply to both local government entities and the shared service venture (where 
the former is an element of agency costs) and relate to the need to provide information for 
statutory reporting and to meet the expectations of constituent local authorities. Information 
costs and thus represents an ongoing cost for most shared service arrangements.  
Co-ordination costs are also an important component to consider for the calculation of nett 
shared services nett savings. Co-ordination costs and refer principally to the staff time 
employed to ensure that all parties to the cooperative venture maintain common goals - 
(initially established and reflected as upfront costs in the negotiating phase -) and act in a 
fashion that reflects the these goals. Co-ordination costs are likely to be proportional to the 
number of municipal partners. They and may be mitigated by trust relationships promoted by 
informal networks, professional standards, and the likelihood of repeated ‘games’,  – 
although if partners ultimately prove untrustworthy then savings in this area are likely to be 
eliminated or exceeded elsewhere (LeRoux et al. 2010; Feiock 2007). One way in which 
savings in co-ordination costs arising from misplaced trust may be eroded or eliminated is in 
the area of free-rider costs. Free-riding occurs in cooperative local service partnerships when 
an entity attempts to pay less than the full price for a good or service consumed (Carr and 
Hawkins 2013). Free-riding might occur if any of the parties to the shared service 
arrangement seek to delay contributions (such as i.e. staff, assets or funds) or contribute less 
than agreed a prioriwhat might have been agreed. This may not always be a visible. For 
example, a local authority could seek to contribute staff or assets of a lower quality than 
might have been reasonably expected in an effort to transfer a portion of its entity-level 
liabilities to the shared service partners.  
Defection costs are generally given to refer to the costs incurred when a partner entity 
withdraws from a shared service arrangement (Dollery et al. 2016). A withdrawal of this kind 
will affect the amortisation of upfront costs, it maycan modify the unit costs of production, it 
may require the replacement of staff and assets (if repatriated to the withdrawing 
municipality), and it may require the re-negotiation of contracts. However, the threat of 
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defection – whether actually made by a local municipality or merely anticipated by other 
partner municipalities – can also fundamentally upset the bargaining equilibria upon which 
the shared service arrangement rests and thus result in costs being incurred. For instance, if 
partner entities believe that one local councilgovernment might withdraw, then itthey may be 
willing to re-distribute the gross transaction surplus or be particularly accommodating to the 
potential defector’s wishes at the expense of the other parties to the collaborative venture.  
Agency costs are a cousin of transaction costs and relate to goal incongruence. F – for 
instance, they arise where an agent does not faithfully represent the interests of the principal, 
due to an inability to correctly perceive the principal’s wishes or a lack of concern for the 
principal’s goals (Brown and Potoski, 2005). In local shared service arrangements, agency 
costs may be amplified due to both the distance between the principal and agent, as well as 
the number of agent-principal relationships, given that representatives on a shared service 
committee or board act as agents of both the constituent municipalities involved as well as 
local residents (Kwon and Feiock 2010).  
This study contributes to the literature on shared servicesdiffers to most in the extant 
literature because we consider the pecuniary outcomes of shared services at the level of the 
individual local government rather than the local service in question. As a resultBecause of 
the different lens through which we view shared services, many costs that reside outside of 
the specific service being shared become visible. We  – and we refer to these expenses as 
‘exogenous costs’ because they are not directly related to the service being shared and would 
generally fall outside of decision making and empirical analyses conducted at the service 
level. Major exogenous costs include erosion of economies of scope, additional staff and 
resource burdens on municipalities as a result of reticence to meaningfully redeploy, as well 
asnd the need to continue to conduct residual elements of functions that have been shared 
(such as handling of complaints).  
Economies of scope arise when a single organisation produces two or more services 
whichservices that employ the same factor inputs. For example, the municipal building, 
information technology and staff used for customer service are typicallyprobably also used 
for procurement activities. If one function is removed from the direct control of a local 
authority (and given over to a shared service arrangement), then an erosion of economies of 
scope may follow. This will result in a relative increase to the unit costs of many of the other 
services that remain at the local municipality in question, and will effectively be reflected as a 
nettt cost at the level of the local government unit (and thus occur independently to savings 
made at the level of the service shared). It is also critical for staff and assets that were 
previously employed in the function being shared to be meaningfully redeployed if they are 
not part of contribution to the collaborative arrangement. It is likely that many local 
municipalities will be reticent to dismiss staff (and legislation or unionisation may in any 
event prevent this in any case) and sale of assets may result in the realisation of book losses. 
The third major class of exogenous cost result from residualisation of elements of the 
function transferred to shared services. In particular, because ‘citizens have difficulties in 
accurately identifying the providers of the services they receive’ it is likely that local 
governments will still have to field complaints and inquiries about services long after the 
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function has been transferred to the collaborative venture (Brown and Potoski 2005, p. 330). 
BNotably, because exogenous costs relate to management decisions and the characteristics of 
particular local governments (such as use of the same factors for production of multiple 
services), exogenous costs may manifest differently for different municipalities even where 
the same service is shared. 
It is worth stressing thatNotably most of the pecuniary costs that we have discussed arise 
entirely as a resulta result of the decision to enter into a shared service arrangement. The 
main exceptions to this are information, co-ordination, agency and free-rider expenses that 
probably also occur for separate production (but manifest in different ways and are easier to 
manage in-house (; Brown and Potoski 2005)).  
Table 1 summarises the pecuniary benefits and costs arising from the decision to move from 
separate production to shared service production.  
[PLEASE INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
Table 1. Pecuniary Benefits and Costs of Moving From Separate to Shared Service 
Production  
A Schematic Structure to Inform Decision Making 
In order to understand why shared services, at the local government level, might result in 
reduced efficiency it is helpful to remind ourselves of the economic rationale for 
decentralised government. The decentralisation theorem ‘establishes, on grounds of economic 
efficiency, a presumption in favour of decentralised provision of public goods with localised 
effects’, which occurs principally as a result of the capacity to cater to the different 
preferences and production costs which is unlikely to occur in (more uniform) centralised 
public service provision (Oates 1999, p. 122). By contrast, shared service provision at a 
regional scale may necessitate uniform standards thereby negating the inclusion of localised 
tastes and spatialy divergent production cost, which are ordinarily used to justify decentralised government on eficiency grounds. Put diferently, shared service provison generaly results in the provison of a uniform standard of service at a cost hat is uniformly apportioned betwen participating local authorites. As a result, welfare loses may result for local residents. 
that couldmight be expected to assist decision makers who are considering moving from separate to shared 
production of a given servicealgorithm. Here 𝛼1refers to the number of shared service 
𝛽1refers to the heterogeneity of said partners. These two factors interact to produce a 
weighting applied to upfront costs and transaction costsongoing costs where expenses might be expected to 
rise as the number and heterogeneity of partners increases. Both upfront and ongoing costs 
are likely to be affected by these two factors although, as we have noted, some costs (like for example co-
ordination costs) will be more sensitive to this weighting than others.  𝛾1refers to the duration 
of the shared service arrangement and it is required to apportion upfront costs over the life of the ventureensure that decision makers remain 
cognisant that in an economic sense upfront costs (which may be substantial) should be 
apportioned over the expected life of the venture (although we acknowledge that this may not 
always be clear). It is noteworthy that the exogenous costs appear outside of the parentheses whichparentheses 
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[PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
 
This shared service savings nettt pecuniary algorithm points to the first hypothesis that we 
will test in the empirical work which follows:schematic structure is also useful to scholars 
because it makes the calculus explicit for the case where services previously produced 
separately are moved to collaborative production. Moreover, itthe schematic clearly identifies 
the different costs which only become apparent when a local government level analysis is 
done. Indeed, given the preponderance of costs and the relative uncertainty of some benefits 
occurring (such asfor instance economies of scale), it would seem likely that a move from 
separate to shared production may well result in an increase to unit expenditure when 
considered in terms of mean aggregate response. A number of hypotheses come to mind 
when examining the schematic structure, but we have selected just two to test in this instance 
owing to word length cthe constraints inherent in a single journal article and data limitations 
(such as for example data on upfront costs or resident tastes): 
H1: due to a combination of upfront costs, transaction costs and exogenous costs, tThe use of 
shared services, rather than continuing to supply services separately, will result in higher 
levels of expenditure -– , on average -– , at the whole-of-local-government level than no 
shared serviceslevel of the local government unit. 
In addition, by using disaggregated data relating to the specific shared service employed by 
particular local councils, we are also able to test a second hypothesis derived from our 
observations regarding how shared services affect the welfare gains derived from differing tastes that lie at the heart of the decentralisation theorem (Oates 1999): 
expenditure as a consequence of providing thesesaid services through co-operative shared 
service ventures (that may result in uniform standards being imposed). 
We now briefly outline our data sources and empirical methodology which we employ to test 











  Page 13 
ContextInstitutional Background and Empirical Strategy 
We tested ourt two hypotheses, and hence some of our theoretical insights, against a five 
yearfive-year panel of data obtained from the SAouth Australian local governments. This test 
was conducted for the purposes of explication on our nett shared services pecuniary 
algorithm. The algorithm is applicable to any jurisdiction abroad, as is the empirical 
methodology that we outline (subject to data availability). Indeed, it would be ideal for our 
study to be replicated in other jurisdictions, given that analyses of multiple jurisdictions is 
well outside of the constraints of a single journal paper.  
SAouth Australian local government currently comprises 68 local authorities operating under 
the Local Government Act 1999 (SA) and the Local Government (Elections) Act 1999 (SA). 
In common with other Australian local government systems, SA councils  and are funded by 
a combination of property taxes (71 per cent), intergovernmental grants (14 per cent), user 
charges (11 per cent) and other revenue (3 per cent) (South Australian Local Government 
Grants Commission (SALGGC,) 2017). In the 2015/16 financial year, property rates 
generated $1.55 billion. Combined with other own-source funding (largely user charges), 
about 86 per cent of total local government income may be characterised as ‘own-source’ 
revenue (South Australian Local Government Association (SALGASA) 2017). 
Just over a third of SAouth Australia councilmunicipalities conduct at least one co-operative 
collaborative venture, although the precise number varies slightly from year to year in 
response to new arrangements being established and existing arrangements discontinued or 
altered. It should be stressed that  (the degree of variation is not sufficient to test dynamic 
effects such as benefits from learning). Table 1 2 categorises shared service arrangements 
according to eight different types of functions. The most common type of shared service is 
waste management and the least common is cemetery services. All services shared are part of 
a historically long remit, thus making it reasonable to assume that services now shared were 
previously provided separately. Moreover, all shared service arrangements that currently take 
place in SA do so between geographically adjacent municipalities. TThe great majority of 
municipalities involved in co-operativecollaborative ventures share just one service (, with 
only three councilmunicipalitiess providing more than two cooperative services). In the 
present context, this suggests a low probability of interaction effects, which would have been 
difficult to model given both the small numbers of councilmunicipalities with multiple co-operativecollaborative 
ventures and the permutations in operation. 
[PLEASE INSERT TABLE 1 2 HERE] 
To determine if shared service arrangements have a statistically significant significantly 
positive association with operational expenditure at the whole-of-local-government levellevel 
of individual local government units, a conventional ordinary least squares model with time 
fixed effects1 was employed. Fixed-effects was not suitable given that the regressors of 
interest were time invariant or almost time invariant (Kennedy 2003) and random-effects 
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explanatory variables might be correlated with the random error term (p = 0.0000). The final 
model specification was: 
: 
Where E is the operational expenditure of a local government (less depreciation expenses), 
expressed on a per assessment basis, X is a vector of control variables which are expected to 
influence operational expenditure (the full list is provided below), S is a binary variable 
coded 1 if the municipality operates under a shared service arrangement (note that this coding 
will also be applied in subsequent models disaggregating shared services into individual 
service categories), and 0 otherwise (if no shared service arrangement exists for the 
municipality), and μ is an independent and identically distributed error term. To account for 
differences in councilmunicipality performance over the period under analysis, indicator 
variables representing individual years were applied. 
The control variables selected for the model (X) which are theorised to significantly influence 
local government expenditure levels include the total number of rateable assessments 
(including residential and commercial properties), population density, the proportion of 
residents under 15 and aged residents (measured through the proportion of  residents 
receiving an aged pension), the proportion of indigenous residents (those identifying as being 
of an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander (ATSI) background), the proportion of residents 
from a non-English speaking (NESB) background, the socioeconomic status of residents 
(measured through the median employment income received and the percentage of residents 
receiving unemployment (Newstart) payments), the proportion of residents receiving federal 
assistance (those receiving the disability support pensions (DSP)), the location of the 
councilmunicipality (whether it is an urban or rural councilmunicipality), the length of sealed 
and unsealed roads, and the Commonwealth Financial Assistance Grant (FAG) received by 
local authorities. The value of total assessments (and its quadratic term used in supplementary 
models) were selected to account for the potential presence of economies of scale (or 
diseconomies of scale) in local government service provision (see Kwon and Feiock 2010) 
which, if present, may serve to lower (increase) expenditure levels incurred by a 
municipality. It is noteworthy that – because the service remit of Australian local government 
is orientated principally towards services to property – we have used number of rating 
assessments (i.e. number of rateable properties) as our unit of analysis (Drew and Dollery 
2014). A measure of population density was included in the model to account for potential 
economies of density (a situation whereby average costs decrease as the population density 
for an area increases (Grant and Drew 2017Holcombe and Williams 2008)). Measures of 
population demographics and socio-economic status were included to account for the well-
documented effect which socio-economic disadvantagedeprivation has in reducing or 
increasing resident demand for services or service quality (Andrews 2004).  
The location of a councilmunicipality (i.e. whether it operates in a rural environment or an 
urban environment) was controlled for in response to the empirical prevalent evidence of 
differing provision of services and hence unit costs of providing services incurred by rural 
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More specifically, residents (and businesses) in rural areas generally receive a lower quantity 
and quality of services compared to their urban counterparts. The conditions of local roads 
maintained by a local authority (whether they are sealed or unsealed) were included to 
account for the substantial differences in expenditure (per kilometre) required to maintain 
these assets (sinceas maintenance costs for the former type of road typically exceed the 
latter). Finally, the inclusion of data relating to FAGsfinancial assistance grants is justified 
due to the previously observed impacts on raising municipal spending (known as the 
‘flypaper effect’), potentially serving to increase municipal expenditure compared to an 
equivalent source of self-generated income (Dollery and Worthington 1995et al. 2006). To 
ensure the robustness of the results obtained, supplementary models incorporating alternative 
specifications (and an alternative mixed-effects statistical approach) were examined and 
found to produce similar results (t. T (these results can be obtained from the authors) upon 
request).  
Where necessary, variables have been transformed into logarithms to correct for skewed 
distributions (see Table 2 3) contains the individual variables transformed). Summary 
statistics for the variables employed in this analysis are presented in Table 2. 
[PLEASE INSERT TABLE 32 HERE] 
Data has been sourced from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) National Regional 
Profile (ABS 2017), the SAouth Australian Local Government Grants Commission (LGGC) 
(20157) Annual Report (SALGGC 2015), and the audited financial statements produced by 
SA municipalities. In particular, information used to determine if a municipality operated 
under a shared service arrangement, and the type of shared service arrangement (if any) was 
obtained from Note 19 to the financial statements (‘Joint Ventures and Interests of Other 
Entities’), ; although for individual counci lmunicipalities this note number occasionally 
varied), supplemented through appendices to the annual reports, which contain the annual 
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Our regression models are designed to test whether there is a statistically significant 
association between unit cost and whether or not local government services are produced 
collaboratively. Moreover, contextual factors mean that our hypotheses are tested for a quite 
specific scenario:  – services which had at some time been produced separately, but are now 
produced collaboratively in geographically adjoining municipalities. It is important to remain 
cognisant that in this paper we are not testing many of the broader questions that might 
derivebe formulated from our schematic structure. For instance, we are not testing questions 
of value for money (hence the absence of variables for quality), nor do we seek to investigate 
in detail the reasons for the change in unit costs (hence absence of variables for production 
process). We are simply trying to establish whether the decision to move to shared service 
production has pecuniary implications at the level of individual local governments and hence 
address an important large gap in the literature, therebyus establishing a foundation for a 
future research agenda.  
Many municipal goods and services are not amenable to economies based on scale and even 
when unit prices are responsive to scale it would be easy for local government to exceed 
optimal scale (and hence potentially incur diseconomies of scale), especially in the absence of 
robust empirical analysis to guide decision making. If we add to this the potential for 
apportioned upfront costs, transaction costs and exogenous costs to exceed any savings that 
might arise from expanded output, then it becomes clear that there are strong grounds for 
hypothesising that shared services might – contrary to widespread belief – actually increase 
whole-of-local-government costs.  
[PLEASE INSERT TABLE 43 HERE] 
THowever, the regressor of interest with respect to H1 is the dummy variable which indicates 
whether or not a given local authority is one of the over a third of municipalities that 
participated in shared service arrangements in SAouth Australia. Model 1 suggests that -– on 
average -– local councilsgovernments participating in shared service arrangements are 
associated with an increase to unit cost in the order of 7.79%, ceteris paribus. This 
association is statistically significant at the 1% level and the size of the coefficient represents 
quite a comparatively strong response (since the average unit costs across SA local 
governmentthe state, over the period of analysis was $1,589.65). The result is important 
because it broadens the evidential base by considering the pecuniary effects at the level of 
individual local governments – therebylikely capturing costs previously outside of service 
level analyses – and in so doing provides scholars and practitioners alike with good reason to 
pause and reconsider widely held assumptions on the matter (Bel and Warner 2015). 
Moreover, this result which strongly supports H1 is likely to come as something as a surprise 
to many of the local council managers who have justified participation in co-operative 
enterprises on the basis of cost-savings. As we have noted there are many other reasons for 
participating in shared services. However, costs savings is a common motivation. Moreover, 
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empirical analysis of the expenditure effects at the whole-of-local-government level. Motivation to participate on the basis of cost savings are thus entirely understandable. 
and found that our regressor of interest was consistently significant at or near the reported 
level. For instance, Model 2 adds a quadratic term for the size proxy (which is frequently 
done in expenditure function analysis) and the regressors attenuate only slightly (the 
participation in shared service arrangements is now associated with an 8.11% increase to unit 
expenditure). The robustness of our results in the face of alternative specifications is entirely 
consistent with our theoretical framework which presents a convincing case against the 
likelihood of whole-of-local-government pecuniary savings arising from shared service 
ventures.schematic structure that highlights the importance of carefully choosing both the 
service (for example, one amenable to scale economies) and partner municipalities 
(particularly with respect to homogeneity) most likely to maximise benefits and minimise 
costs associated with moving to shared service production. 
IAs we have noted, in Australian local government, shared services can be classified 
according to eight different types of serviceses. Moreover, as we have noted, there are solid 
grounds for presuming that some service types will be more amenable to eliciting lower unit 
costs than others. Specifically, a large source of welfare gains (and associated costs savings) 
deriving from decentralised government relate to catering to the differing tastes and 
preferences of identifiable communities. It would thus seem reasonable to posit that services 
largely defined by community taste might be most likely to be associated with positive 
coefficients whilst services that are more likely to beinvariably initially uniform in standard 
mayight be better suited to co-operativecollaborative ventures (see, for instance, Oates 201319992011; Dollery et al. 
2006; Grant and Drew 2017).  
However, it is no easy matter to definitively determine which services are most likely to vary 
significantly with community taste in the absence of comprehensive service specific quality 
data (which does not exist in SA local governmentfor South Australia, nor for most other 
local government systems). However, it is not unreasonable to suggest that waste collection 
(some municipalities collect only general waste, others have separate collections for green 
waste, and various degrees of disaggregation of waste recycling), transport (the frequency 
and routes of community bus services would seem to be highly responsive to community 
taste), and procurement (materials ordered will be reflected in most services delivered to 
residents, ranging from the quality of the paper on which councilmunicipality newsletters are 
printed through to the quality of materials used to construct substrates and road services) will 
all be responsive to community taste. By contrast, a minimum level of water quality is 
imposed on local authorities by statute, whilst the depth and width of graves is regulated by 
Australian standards and thus cannot change significantly inis thus relatively less likely to be  
responsivee to community taste (headstones and other monuments are generally purchased 
separately). We concede that there may be some variation in response to community taste for 
these services, but the existence of a statutory floor for standards certainly reduces the 
likelihood of large disparities relative to unregulated services. Similarly health inspections of 
food retailers and the like, which form the bulk of municipal health shared services, have to 
be completed according to statutory standards and they are thus unlikely to be overly 
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result in legal contest by aggrieved retailers). However, it is difficult to ascertain a priori how taste might affectIt is more difficult to determine the effect of 
resident taste for other services such as flood mitigation work (in the absence of additional 
qualitative data) given that  flood mitigation works as there are substantial environmental factors to consider which 
might reasonably be expected to impact on the frequency and types of works undertaken. 
Similarly, preferences for equipment are difficult to foretell given that the taste of municipal 
employees may well override preferences of the local community (who in all likelihood will 
anyway be oblivious to the brand of telephone or machinery used by councilmunicipality 
employees). 
In sum, if our hypothesising in section 2 is correct, thenwith reference to the theoretical 
considerationseconomic theory presented in Section 2 and drawing plausible deductions from 
the nature of some functions in Australian local government, we might reasonably expect 
positive coefficients for waste, transport and procurement, but negative coefficients for water, 
health and cemeteries. 
Table 43 reports the results obtained under Model 3: Shared waste, transport and procurement 
services are associated with positive coefficients, although only procurement is statistically 
significant (where the base group is councilmunicipalities with no shared services). Indeed, 
participation in shared service procurement was associated with an additional operational 
expenditure of 18.97% at the 1% level of statistical significance relative to the base group of 
councilmunicipalities with no shared service arrangements at all, ceteris paribus. By way of 
contrast, shared water, health and cemeteries (i.e. shared services which are less likely to 
reflect local preferences and hence are more likely to generate overall savings) had negative 
coefficients (with respect to a base group of councilmunicipalities with no shared services). 
However, only one of these shared services had a statistically significant association: health 
was associated with a 21.71% reduction in overall unit cost compared to the base group with 
no shared services whatsoever, ceteris paribus. Of the remaining shared service types, flood 
works was associated with a statistically significant positive association of 8.64% at the 5% 
level of significance relative to the base group of no shared services, while shared services for 
equipment had a negative coefficient, but was not statistically significant.  
On balance our evidence provides some support for H2, but it cannot be considered 
conclusive. To provide additional support for this hypothesis it would be necessary to 
conduct analyses for other local government systems, preferably where quantitative 
investigation and deductive reasoning could be augmented with service quality data, shedding 
light on thethus shedding more light on the effect of degree of variability reflective of local 
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Conclusion and Recommendations 
This paper pursuedset out two related objectives. First we wished to broaden the perspective 
taken on shared services from the level of the specific service to be shared to the level of the 
individual local government. The main output arising from this objective was a schematic 
structure that laid bare the benefit and cost calculus – at the level of an individual local 
councilgovernment – that emerges when a decision is made to shift from separate to shared 
provision of services. The second objective, was to empirically investigate the nettt pecuniary 
outcomes – at the level of individual local authoritiesgovernments – associated with shared 
services by geographically adjacent municipalities under the assumption that services had 
previously been produced separately. The main output arising from this objective were a 
number of econometric analyses conducted on a five yearfive-year panel of SAouth 
Australian local government expenditure data.  
The schematic structure developed in this paper work could be a helpful decision-making tool 
for practitioners considering a shift from separate to shared service production. In particular, 
ourthe schematic structure serves a useful purpose by drawing attention to the type of service 
and service partners most likely to yield optimal pecuniary outcomes. It also provides 
decision-makers with a thorough account of costs likely to be incurred.  –I in particular, itthe 
schematic makes explicit exogenous costs which have hitherto been neglected in the literature 
due to the fact that they only become visible when the unit of analysis is broadened to that of 
the whole local government entity. Being aware of these costs may help practitioners to 
optimise outcomes.  – Ffor instance, it might prompts decision makers to meaningfully 
redeploy or retire staff and assets previously engaged in the function that have not been 
contributed to the collaborative venture.  
Our empirical resultsThe empirical work challenges the findingsresults of many previous 
service level analyses and thus helps to establish a case for local government level analysis 
whichanalysis that may better capture all of the costs associated with the decision to shift 
from separate to shared production. Indeed, it provides evidence of statistically significant 
and fairlyquite strong mean increases to unit expenditure in the order of 8.11%, ceteris 
paribus. This suggests that a shift to shared services will typically result in higher 
expenditure, although readers should remain cognisant that regression looks at the mean 
response and that some arrangements might in fact result in pecuniary savings (especially if 
managed carefully along the lines suggested by our schematic structure). Indeed, we also 
provide some evidence, augmented by deductive reasoning, to support the contention that 
services which are more likely to vary by resident taste are also more likely to experience 
increases to unit cost in the event that they are shifted to shared production,  (although this 
cannot be considered definitive). In sum, our empirical analyses should give practitioners and 
scholars good reason to pause and rethink some of the pervasive assumptions regarding the 
pecuniary implications arising from shared service production that are commonly 
encountered in the grey and scholarly literatures. We emphasise that the empirical work did 
not test the entire schematic structure but rather specific questions relating to the aggregate 
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Indeed, our work still leaves a number of questions unanswered and thus sets out an 
important potential future research agenda. For instance, our empirical analysis did not seek 
to answer questions regarding the mechanism through which the additional pecuniary 
outcomes came to pass. Future work that can access precise data for upfront, ongoing and 
exogenous costs respectively would contribute greatly to our understanding of local 
government level outcomes. The existing analysis is also unable to answer questions about 
value for money. – Aadditional data, where available, on service quality would be required to 
investigate this questionissue further. Nor could we investigate dynamic outcomes – in 
particular outcomes from learning which might arise only in the medium term – due to the 
fact that the SAouth Australian shared service cohort experienced little change in 
composition over the five years. In addition, our work cannot be directly applied to the case 
where collaborative production is contemplated for entirely new services – in these instances, 
the comparative calculus changes significantly (for instance upfront costs would be required 
by both separate and shared service production modes, thus significantly increasing the 
attractiveness of the collaborative option). In sum, whilst the paper has mounted a largely 
successful challenge to the extant practice of analysing the efficacy of collaborative 
arrangements at the level of the specific service, it has only begun to exploit the full potential 
of recalibrating the unit of analysis to the level of individual local governments.  
It might also be noted that the theorising and empirical work in this paper is only relevant 
where the principal motivation for entering into collaborative arrangements is to save money. 
This is indeed the most commonly cited motivation, but as we outlined in the introduction it 
is far from being the only reason for sharing production. However, where the motivation is 
principally pecuniary in nature, then our findingswork makes a strong case that (when viewed 
from the perspective of nett outcomes for individual local councilsgovernments) it may be 
prudent to set aside the assumption that it is always good to share. 
As we have seen, whereas the empirical analysis of shared services in local government has 
attracted much less attention than other approaches to improving municipal service provision, 
such as council consolidation and privatisation, the bulk of empirical work on shared services 
has concentrated on the assessment of specific types of service provision, most notably waste 
collection and processing (Bel and Gradus 2018). Furthermore, the conceptual perspectives 
on shared services in local government have largely been shaped with an implicit emphasis 
on the impact of a given service and its potential for cooperative provision.  
The whole-of-local-government level approach developed in this paper serves to act as a 
cautionary mechanism in local government decision making. It demonstrates inter alia that 
whether or not a given municipality should enter into shared service arrangements depends to 
a large degree on (a) the rationale for the cooperative venture and (b) the unit level at which 
the shared service arrangement is evaluated. Our findings suggest that when pecuniary 
savings are the major reason for the proposed venture and when the venture is considered at a 
whole-of-government level, then it is likely that many potential shared service arrangements 
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